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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ 
Respondent, 
v. 
BRYAN 0. RASMUSSEN, 
Case No. 950521-CA 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Petitioner, Bryan O. Rasmussen, files this 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or muie JIPIHOIJS 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more 
other persons would be criminally liable for the 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if 
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases 
or the information or indictment in felony cases 
notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of 
the allegation he committed the offense in concert 
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the 
defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which 
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 
37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related 
offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under' Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in 
Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 
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76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(I) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation 
of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 
76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in 
Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of the sentence required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be 
best served; and 
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(b) states the specific circumstances justifying 
the disposition on the record and in writing. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
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ISSUES OF LAW WHICH NEED TO BE READDRESSED 
1. The opinion incorrectly holds that the State is 
entitled to a second sentencing hearing where it may present 
evidence that it voluntarily declined to submit at the initial 
sentencing hearing, rather than merely remanding for findings based 
on the record already created. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN AT 
SENTENCING OF PROVING BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE THAT MR. RASMUSSEN ACTED IN 
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE OTHERS, AND IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A SUCCESSIVE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
In its opinion, attached as addendum A, this Court found 
that the trial court failed to make written findings concerning the 
applicability of the gang enhancement as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1(5)(c) (1995). However, rather than remanding for the 
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make findings based 
on the record already created, this Court remanded for a complete 
evidentiary hearing in addition to requesting the necessary 
findings. 
There is nothing in the sentencing hearing transcript 
that indicates that the State was precluded from introducing any 
evidence it may have desired on the issue of gang enhancement 
applicability. R. 109 ("THE COURT: Mr. Gunnarson, the state have 
anything to add in this matter?" The State added a few comments, 
but did not call or attempt to call any witnesses) . The State had 
its opportunity, but declined to present any witnesses or other 
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evidence at the sentencing hearing. The State should be bound by 
the evidentiary record it created at the sentencing hearing on 
August 4, 1995. 
11
 [A] defendant is entitled to due process protections 
during sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." State v. 
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-5 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Bell, 754 
P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988), and State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 
(Utah 1982)). As a matter of both due process and simple logic, 
the factual predicate for a sentence needs to be fully developed 
before that sentence may properly be imposed. Because a proper 
factual predicate was not developed here, the enhanced sentence may 
not be imposed. 
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993) is 
controlling on the issue of remands for successive evidentiary 
hearings. Gutierrez involved an appeal of the trial court's 
refusal to suppress a confession taken in violation of Miranda. On 
appeal, the State requested a remand for an evidentiary hearing. 
This Court agreed with defendant that the authority relied upon by 
the State did not support a remand for an evidentiary hearing. 864 
P. 2d at 903. This Court1 wrote: 
In contrast to Willett [ v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 863 
(Utah 1992)] and FState v. 1 Strain, [779 P.2d 221, 227 
(Utah 1989) ,] the trial court in this case directly ruled 
on the suppression issue, basing its ruling on all the 
evidence the State elected to submit, and this court has 
a complete transcript of the evidence submitted and the 
hearing at which that evidence was considered." 
xThe Gutierrez opinion was authored by Judge Greenwood, with 
Judges Billings and Garff concurring. 
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Having concluded that remanding this case would 
give the State an unprecedented opportunity to bolster or 
modify the prosecution's original argument, taking 
advantage of a retrospective critique by the State, we 
find no legal basis for the remand requested by the 
State." Furthermore, remand as requested by the State 
would not be sound judicial policy, as it would permit 
successive attempts to introduce evidence overlooked in 
prior hearings, thus preventing final conclusion of these 
proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that the State's 
request for a remand of this case is both legally and 
factually untenable. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 903. 
The same result should pertain here. The trial court 
here ruled, imposing gang enhancements, "basing its ruling on all 
the evidence the State elected to submit, and this court has a 
complete transcript of the evidence submitted and the hearing at 
which that evidence was considered." 
Other case law is in accord. Cases discussing inadequate 
findings have not remanded for new evidentiary hearings. E.g. In 
re Estate of Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App. 1992) : 
Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports 
the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate 
findings of fact precludes appellate review of the 
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision 
and requires remand for more detailed findings by the 
trial court. See Woodwardrv. Fazziol, 823 P.2d [474,] 
478-479 [(Utah App. 1991)]; State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 
767, 770-71 (Utah App. 1990). 
Only where the trial court has denied a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard is an evidentiary remand appropriate. E.g. 
State v. Starnes, 841 P. 2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1992) ("Inasmuch as 
we conclude that Starnes was not afforded a 'full hearing' as 
required by statute, we vacate the restitution judgment entered and 
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remand for a full evidentiary hearing wherein Starnes can introduce 
his evidence."). 
Here, at most the State is entitled only to a limited 
remand to allow the trial court to enter findings supporting the 
imposition of the gang enhancement, premised on the evidence 
previously adduced.2 This Court should rehear this case and vacate 
that portion of its memorandum decision granting the State an 
evidentiary hearing. 
POINT 11 . BECAUSE THE RECORD HERE IS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF GANG 
ENHANCEMENTS ON MR. RASMUSSEN, THIS COURT MAY 
VACATE THE GANG ENHANCEMENTS WITHOUT ORDERING 
A REMAND FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS. 
Where the record is sufficiently complete and clear, 
remand for factual findings is unnecessary and this Court may rule 
directly on the pertinent issue: 
Although the trial court did not make any findings as to 
the purpose or flagrancy of the officers' behavior, the 
record is sufficient for us to make this determination. 
See Sims v. Collection Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 841 
P.2d 6, 10 (1992); State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129, 130-32 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 
704 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1273 (Utah 1993). 
2Because there is no evidence in the record on which such a 
finding could possibly be premised, see Mr. Rasmussen's reply brief 
at 6-12 (attached as addendum B), it would make sense to grant the 
trial court further authority to vacate imposition of the gang 
enhancement. Requiring the trial court to admit that there is no 
evidence supporting imposition of the gang enhancement, and waiting 
for an appeal from that finding before the enhancements may 
actually be vacated, is decidedly inefficient. 
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Here, there is no evidence supporting imposition of the 
gang enhancement. See Mr. Rasmussen's reply brief at 6-12, 
attached as addendum B. As a matter of judicial economy, this 
Court should vacate the gang enhancements imposed, rather than 
requiring the unnecessary intermediate step of requiring the trial 
court to make factual findings. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be reheard. The State is not entitled 
to another sentencing hearing to present evidence it should have 
presented before. At most the State is entitled to remand for 
entry of factual findings. Because the record here is sufficiently 
clear, and there is no evidence to support imposition of the gang 
enhancements, this Court may vacate the enhancements directly. 
As set forth in Rule 40(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, counsel's signature below operates as a certificate that 
this pleading is offered in good faith and not for any improper 
purpose, including but not limited to delay. See Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. ^/ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T day of November, 1996. 
^f^W-— 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
JUDITH A. JENSEN 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 7 day of 
November, 1996. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of November, 1996. 
10 
ADDENDUM A 
Opinion in State v. Rasmussen, No. 950521-CA (Utah App. 
October 24, 1996) . 
FILED 
OCr 2<M996 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS _ a . 
COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bryan 0. Rasmussen, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950521-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 24, 1996) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Robert K. Heineman and Judith A. Jensen, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Bryan Rasmussen challenges the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) on federal and state constitutional 
grounds. A recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court, State v. 
LflbruiD/ 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (1996), mandates that we remand 
this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and entry 
of findings, and precludes us from addressing the constitutional 
issues raised by defendant. 
In sentencing defendant after acceptance of his guilty plea, 
the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, nor did 
it enter findings of fact supporting imposition of the section 
76-3-203.1 gang enhancement sentence. The State has requested 
that we remand this case for an evidentiary hearing and entry of 
findings in accord with section 76-3-2-3.1, which requires that 
lf[i]n conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (c) (1995). 
After the briefs were filed in this case, but before oral 
argument, the Utah Supreme Court issued Labrum. which 
specifically addressed whether a trial court must make findings 
in support of the imposition of section 76-3-203.1. The Labrum 
court held that the trial court committed plain error because "no 
specific finding was entered with respect to the complicity of 
the other two persons who accompanied" the defendant, Labrum. 
293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Because the error was both plain and 
prejudicial, it was not waived by failure of the defendant to 
enter a timely objection. Id. We agree with the State that 
under Labrum the trial court fs failure in this case to enter 
findings in support of the imposition of the section 76-3-203.1 
sentence enhancement was plain error. Accordingly, we must 
remand. 
Furthermore, without comment on the merits of the argument, 
a remand to determine whether defendant acted "in concert" under 
section 76-3-203.1 is appropriate even in the absence of Labrum. 
The State contends that defendant admitted to acting "in concert" 
with others and raises only a facial challenge to the statute. 
The State argues defendant cannot raise an as-applied 
constitutional challenge and is therefore also precluded from 
raising a facial constitutional challenge. See State v. Mace, 
921 P.2d 13 72, 13 79 (Utah 1996) (holding that defendant did not 
have standing to raise facial constitutional challenge where 
statute did not apply to his factual circumstances). Defendant 
disputes the State's position, arguing that he did not admit that 
section 76-3-203.1 was constitutional as applied to his 
circumstances. After review, we believe the record is unclear on 
this issue, and therefore an evidentiary hearing and entry of 
findings is doubly appropriate. 
Consequently, as in Labrum. we "remand to the trial court 
for further proceedings in compliance with [section] 76-3-203.1.n 
Labrumr 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Upon remand, the trial court 
should hold an evidentiary hearing on the factual circumstances 
which support the imposition of section 76-3-203.1, and enter 
appropriate findings. 
^ 7~ 
Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
-4-
udith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K>r Orme, 
Presiding Judge 
950521-CA 
ADDENDUM B 
Excerpt from Mr. Rasmussen's reply brief, pp. 6-12, 
addressing lack of any evidence to support imposition of the gang 
enhancements. 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
HERE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Facts 
at p. 5; Point I.B. (pp. 11-13); Point I.D. 
at p. 16; Point III.B. at p. 27) 
A. MR. RASMUSSEN1 S ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED 
"AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE" IS NOT AN 
ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED "IN CONCERT WITH 
TWO OR MORE PERSONS." 
The State asserts that "[w]hen he pleaded guilty, 
Rasmussen admitted that he acted fas a party to1 the offenses (R. 
43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting the factual predicate for the 
section 76-3-203.1 fin concert1 sentence enhancement." Br. 
Appellee at 5. Mr. Rasmussen did in fact admit that he acted "as 
a party to" the offenses. However, this language merely tracks 
the usual formulation of charging informations. E.g. State v. 
Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 994 (Utah 1993) ("Ricky Brad Abeyta, a 
party to the offense . . . " ) ; State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 153 
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(Utah 1989) ("GARY CHARLES TRIPTOW, a party to the offense 
. . . " ) ; State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 135 (Utah App. 1989) 
("James Jamison, a party to the offense . . . " ) . Copies of R. 
43-45 and 94-96 are attached as Addendum A. Nowhere is there any 
admission that Mr. Rasmussen committed the crimes "in concert 
with two or more persons." 
Mr. Rasmussen!s pleas of guilty only admitted the 
underlying offenses, and said nothing about what sentences and 
possible enhancements would be applicable.1 Mr. Rasmussen 
admitted nothing beyond the fact that he, individually, committed 
the underlying offenses. Section 76-3-203.1 requires a finding 
by the sentencing judge that the defendant committed the crime 
"in concert with two or more persons." Here, there was no 
evidence from which the trial court could reasonably make that 
finding. 
The Statefs contention that Mr. Rasmussenfs guilty 
pleas to only the underlying offenses also constitute an 
admission that the gang enhancement is applicable contradicts its 
entire argument in this case. Mr. Rasmussen contends that "in 
concert" activity is a separate element of a newly defined 
aggravated crime, and should be proven at trial with all the 
attendant due process protections, including the right to a 
unanimous jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Br. Appellant, Point I (pp. 11-23). The State has steadfastly 
xIt is, of course, permissible for a defendant to admit the 
factual predicate for any enhancement, but this did not occur in 
the case at bar. 
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opposed this contention. Memorandum Supporting the 
Constitutionality of Gang Enhancement Statute, R. 29-38 at 34 
("Sentencing under U.C.A. § 76-3-203.1 includes the determination 
that the defendant committed the criminal act in concert with two 
or more persons."). Mr. Rasmussen's pleas to the underlying 
offenses alone can only constitute an admission of the in concert 
activity if in concert activity is an element. If, as the State 
has argued, it is merely a sentencing consideration, then the 
plea to the underlying offense, by itself, cannot be an admission 
that the sentencing enhancement is applicable. 
The State cannot have it both ways. If the in concert 
activity is a necessary element of a new offense, Mr. Rasmussen's 
motion should have been granted and he prevails here. If not, 
then his pleas to only the underlying offenses are insufficient 
to support application of the enhanced sentence, and the 
enhancements must be vacated. 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT CONCEDE THAT THE 
GANG ENHANCEMENT WAS PROPERLY 
APPLICABLE. 
The State further asserts that Mr. Rasmussen "agreed" 
that the enhancement was applicable, citing to R. 105. Br. 
Appellee at 11. The page referenced by the State concerned the 
degree of the enhancement, if any, that was applicable in light 
of the fact that the theft charges, which were originally 2nd 
degree felonies, were reduced to 3rd degree felonies as a result 
of the legislature's amendment of the offense level 
classifications in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) 
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(effective May 1, 1995) . See R. 57-8 (motion and stipulation to 
reduce category of offense), 59 (order). 
Defense counsel did not agree that any enhancement 
should be imposed. The plea agreement does not indicate that any 
such admission was part of the bargain. Absent any such 
agreement as part of the plea bargain, defense counsel would 
violate his or her duty of loyalty and zealous representation by 
asserting that the client should receive a harsher sentence. 
State v. Holland, 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1996). 
C. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT HERE WAS APPLIED IN 
A PERFUNCTORY MANNER, WITH NO EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION. 
The State asserts that " [b]ecause Rasmussen never 
submitted the fin concert1 issue and the intent of his co-
perpetrators to any adversarial testing, he cannot complain that 
the issue would have been perfunctorily decided, or too 
complicated for the trial court to decide, in his case." Br. 
Appellee at 11-12. This proposition rests on the incorrect 
notion that Mr. Rasmussen either admitted he acted in concert, or 
stipulated that the enhancement could be applied to him. To the 
contrary, no such admissions or stipulations are contained in the 
record. 
Mr. Rasmussen appeared at sentencing, represented by 
counsel, and the matter of his sentence was subjected to 
adversarial testing. See August 4, 1995 Reporter's Transcript of 
Sentencing Proceedings, R. 103-112. For whatever reason, the 
State put on no evidence concerning any codefendants or uncharged 
9 
other actors, their actions, or their mental states. R. 109. 
The trial court's findings fail to identify any such other 
actors, what their involvement was, or the nature of their 
criminal mens rea. Based on the dearth of evidence before the 
trial court, no such findings could be made. 
The sum total of what was before the judge concerning 
in concert activity consists of the bare allegations of the 
information, R. 7-11. The information, sworn to by Det. J. W. 
Prior, asserts: 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agent Jeff 
Sarnacki will testify that on December 17, 1994, he 
interviewed defendant Cheeney. After being informed of 
his constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak 
without an attorney present, defendant Cheeney admitted 
to all of the above conduct and that defendant 
Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant 
Cheeney also admitted that defendant Hoffman was 
involved in all but the Sundance Institute burglary and 
theft. 
R. 11. Criminal informations are not evidence. If they were, 
there would be little need for preliminary hearings: the 
information could be used to establish by a preponderance all of 
the allegations. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah 
1995) (probable cause standard is lower than preponderance 
standard). 
Additionally, the information suffers from multiple 
hearsay problems. Det. Prior is reporting concerning information 
relayed to him by unknown means concerning statements allegedly 
made by co-defendant Cheeney to ATF agent Sarnacki. This 
information is at best triple hearsay, and as a matter of due 
process is insufficiently reliable to be relied on at sentencing. 
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State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ("Although 
hearsay evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding, 
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a 
high probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the 
basis for sentencing."). Bruton problems are likewise palpable: 
the information relies entirely on the confession of a co-
defendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125, 88 S.Ct. 
1620, 1622, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (U.S. 1968) (admission of co-
defendant's confession at joint trial violated sixth amendment 
right to confrontation and cross-examination) . 
Fully marshalled, there is insufficient evidence to 
support imposition of the gang enhancements here. Even though 
Christopher Cheeney pleaded guilty to the Sundance Institute 
counts on September 8, 1995, this was more than a month after Mr. 
Rasmussen!s sentence was imposed. See Statement of Defendant, 
Certificate of Counsel, and Order for Mr. Cheeney, R. 27-36 in 
Case No. 950720-CA, attached as Addendum B. Even if the court 
could somehow take judicial notice of future events,2 the State 
would still be one actor short of showing action "in concert with 
two or more persons" on that charge. Appropriately, no gang 
enhancement was applied to Mr. Rasmussen on the Sundance 
Institute counts. Mr. Cheeney did not plead guilty to any of the 
three remaining counts, for which Mr. Rasmussen did receive gang 
enhancements. 
2This premise is, of course, patently absurd. 
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The gang enhancement in this case was applied in a most 
perfunctory manner, based on nothing more than the bare 
allegations of the charging information. Due process has been 
violated. The gang enhancements imposed must be vacated. 
POINT II. UNDER McMILLAN. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
EXCEEDS THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS 
OF OFFENSE DEFINITION AS THE TAIL (THE GANG 
ENHANCEMENT) IS WAGGING THE DOG (THE 
UNDERLYING OFFENSE) . 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.D. (pp. 
15-17) 
Under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the legislature's designation of "in 
concert" activity as a sentencing consideration rather than a 
substantive element violates due process. As explained earlier, 
the State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen never "demanded a 
factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or otherwise," Br. 
Appellee at 16, is not well taken. First, Mr. Rasmussen 
requested that the trial court hold that the issue of "in 
concert" activity should be decided by a jury at trial. R. 25-6. 
Mr. Rasmussen did not waive sentencing; the State was required to 
establish a factual predicate for the application of the gang 
enhancement at the sentencing hearing. Having failed to do so, 
the enhancement is not applicable. 
The State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen cites no 
authority, Br. Appellee at 16, is frivolous. McMillan is cited 
repeatedly, Br. Appellant at 13-15, 18, 19, and mandates that the 
statutory scheme here be held unconstitutional. 
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